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The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was put in place principally to serve as a bargaining 
power of the South. The historical antecedence of OPEC indicates an Organization that was necessary because of 
the exploitation of the Northern developed countries through their oil companies. In essence, OPEC came to put 
a stop to what was considered as those tendencies by the Northern developed countries at ensuring that those 
years of colonialism and slavery which put the South at a disadvantage continued with oil. One interesting thing 
about international oil politics is that developing nations that were at a disadvantage in the structuring of 
international relations and in particular international economic system of the globe were appreciably at an 
advantage in oil politics. This is because reserves as well as production of oil benefit the Southern developing 
nations while the North with a large appetite in consumption is appreciably at a disadvantage. One would have 
expected therefore that in this particular area where the South was at an advantage it would automatically be in 
control, a situation that was unfortunately not so before OPEC came into being. In variably, OPEC would have 
ordinarily been expected to serve the interest of the South by coordinating Southern interests in oil and ensuring 
that the North is put in its normal place as far as issues relating to oil are concerned. This work therefore is aimed 
at relating OPEC’s formative years to its performance after coming into existence. It is meant to confirm and 
affirm whether or not OPEC has been able to meet up to its expectation of a Southern bargaining organization 
which it was meant to be at inception. The work employs an analytical methodology in which it relates those 
basic elements that necessitated an OPEC with those different areas in which it has performed with a view to 
determining whether or not the organization had lived up to expectation. The work finds out that certain internal 
crisis within OPEC have made it impossible for the organization to live up to expectation. It concludes that until 
OPEC moves away from viewing issues from Arab-non-Arab perspective it will not be able to serve its purpose 
effectively as a Southern bargaining organization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
OPEC is one of those few organizations in the global community that serves the interest of a particular group of 
nations and by implication there cannot be any effective and efficient assessment of OPEC except through the 
responsibility it holds as a bargaining organization. How much OPEC has been able to perform in the sphere can 
be linked to both internal and external issues within the organization. Internal because even OPEC as an 
organization has not helped matters in some areas especially in terms of its relations with member countries 
treating them not as one but as different units where some are favoured well above and over others. External 
challenges are in the area of the Northern countries that could have been said to be displaced by an OPEC 
coming into being that fought considerably at making the organization as ineffective and inefficient as possible. 
The work therefore is divided into four different sections. The first views what was in place before OPEC ever 
came into being, the second looked at the basis of an OPEC while the third analyzes the performance of the 
organization. The fourth section concludes. 
 
Oil Under a Northern Control 
The period before the OPEC control of the 1970s was extensively used by the Northern developed nations to 
control all activities that relate to oil. This period was therefore one in which the Northern control of Southern 
developing nations was extended to the politics of oil. This was because their home countries backed virtually 
every action of oil companies. 
For most of the twentieth century, the international oil system was controlled by a producer cartel1. By 
1973, the cartel consisted of an oligopoly of seven international oil companies2. The “Seven Sisters” were made 
                                                 
1 Spero, J. E.1990. The Politics of International Economic Relations. New York, St. Martins Press..261 
2 See Adelman A. M.1972. The World Petroleum Market.  
Baltimore, John Hopkins University ; Hartshorn J.E. 1967..Politics and World Oil Economies: An Account of the 
International Oil Industry in its political environment. New York, Praeger;  Penrose T. E.1969. The Large 
International Firm in Developing Industry. Cambridge, MIT Press; Sampson,. A.1978. The Seven Sisters;The 
Great Oil Companies and the World they made. New York, Viking. 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.4, No.10, 2014 
 
48 
up of five American (Standard oil of New Jersey now known as Exxon, Standard oil of California, now known 
as Chevron; Gulf now part of Chevron; Mobil and Texaco), one British (British Petroleum) and one Anglo-
Dutch (Royal Dutch-Shell). This was reinforced by the fact that by the early twentieth century, even though oil 
production continued to climb and by 1920, production had reached 450 million barrels, the US produced 
between 60 and 70 percent of the world’s oil supply. Oil was only discovered in Mexico at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, in Iran in 1908, in Venezuela during World War I and in Iraq in 1927.By the early twentieth 
century therefore the control of oil was almost absolutely in the hands of the North, the oil companies had their 
headquarters in the North while reserves also favoured the North. 
  It can hardly be doubted therefore that the home countries of these companies extended the existing 
control and authority over the Southern States where the oil reserves were situated and also effectively used the 
period to ensure that the “Seven Sisters” controlled oil activities in the international community. To the North 
therefore, only by maintaining and retaining the control can the status quo be firmly rooted. From the period in 
which oil became a critical product to the international community and until OPEC took firm control; the North 
extended its political and economic authority to oil. 
What clearly demonstrates that the “Seven Sisters” represented an extension of the Northern hold on the 
South was that by the late 19th century, the oil companies had moved abroad to obtain control of foreign supplies 
on extremely favourable terms1. To ensure that such control was as firm as possible, immediately after World 
War I, the seven companies had moved further forming joint ventures to explore for foreign oil fields and 
eventually in the 1920s they began to divide up sources of supply by explicit agreements.   
The companies did this by dividing markets and fixing world prices and by discriminating against 
outsiders2. The discrimination not only indicated that the “Seven Sisters” intended to be in firm control but was a 
strategy to make it impossible for the new sources of supply to form the same type of cartel. This clearly shows 
two things, the first being that the cartelisation that the North consistently opposes and condemns in OPEC was 
not only in existence in the days of the “Seven Sisters” but was in fact given strong support by the North. The 
second is that the “Seven Sisters”, and by extension the North, had, several years before the formation of the 
OPEC envisaged its formation and had worked extensively against its establishment.  
This the “Seven Sisters” did by not only keeping outsiders out of all operations of the Seven Sisters but 
in giving every support it could muster for the oil industries. The evidence that the North saw in these seven 
companies, an opportunity to extend the initial control it had on the South is in the fact that governments in the 
North (the USA, Britain and Holland) provided a favourable political and military environment to actively 
support the oil companies owned by their nationals. In Iran for instance, the crisis over a new agreement with the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which invariably necessitated a nationalization of the Company’s assets, brought 
the British government in confrontation with the Iranian government and actually contributed immensely to the 
demise of the then Iranian government. The United States which played a notable role in bringing the Iranian 
government down also did all within its power to ensure that her (US) companies replaced the Anglo-Iranian 
Company.3 
 It could not have therefore come as a surprise that   in bargaining with the oil companies, the less 
developed oil producing countries were confronted with two major and fundamental obstacles; an oligopoly 
supported by powerful Northern governments as well as uncertainty about the success of oil exploration and the 
availability of alternative sources of supply.4   
Unfortunately, because new discoveries when they came were made during colonialism, the hold of the 
North on the South did not reduce with those discoveries. Since many of the new oil discoveries occurred in 
areas dominated by Britain and the Netherlands; in the Dutch East Indices, as well as Iran and British mandates 
in the Middle East it only increased the Northern control on the South. Invariably, by 1919, Britain controlled 50 
percent of the world’s proven oil reserves.5In essence, both production and reserves favoured the North. 
Invariably, even when policy makers and the oil industry focused their attention on the Middle East, 
particularly the Persian Gulf, which they believed would be the center of post war oil production; it did not in 
any way alter the Northern control on oil. As early as the 1930s therefore, Britain had gained control over Iran’s 
oil fields, while the United States discovered oil in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
 The struggle for control of the Middle Eastern oil fields was followed by the formation of a cartel by 
                                                 
1 Mikdashi, Z.1966. A Financial Analysis of Middle Eastern Oil Concessions: 1901 – 1965. New York, Praeger; 
Issawi C. and Yegaleh M.1962. The Economics of Middle Eastern Oil .New York, Praeger. 24-40. 
2 Penrose T. E. 1969. The Large International Firm in Developing Industry.Cambridge, MIT Press. 223. 
3 Schwadran, B.1955. The Middle east, Oil and the Great Powers, New York, Council for Middle Eastern 
Affairs.103-152. 
4 Edwards G. G. 1971. Foreign Petroleum Companies and the State in Venezuela. Foreign Investment in the 
Petroleum and Mineral Industries M. F. Raymond et al; Eds. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press. 101-128. 
5 Ibid.115. 
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the seven major oil companies. Efforts of the companies to establish a monopoly, or rather an oligopoly over the 
production, refining, marketing, etc. of oil were aimed at establishing an international cartel to regulate prices 
and competition in such a way as to guarantee profits to all members of the cartel.1          
  There were however clear indications of the lack of consensus of the Northern nations even in these 
early years. For instance, after the First World War, a bitter struggle for control of World oil reserves erupted. 
The British, the Dutch and the French excluded American companies from purchasing oil field in territories 
under their control. The United States’ Congress had to retaliate in 1920 by adopting the Mineral Levy Act, 
which denied access to American oil reserves to any foreign country that restricted American access to its 
reserves. Probably due to the congress’ decision, the dispute was ultimately resolved in 1920 when American oil 
companies were finally allowed to drill the British Middle East and the Dutch East Indies.2 
Events immediately after the Second World War however introduced dramatic changes to the position 
of oil in the international community. In the first place, relatively inexpensive imported oil became the primary 
source of energy for the developed World, and both Western Europe and Japan, with virtually no oil supplies of 
their own, became significant importers of oil.3 
Secondly, when by 1950, US oil consumption outdistanced its vast domestic production; the United 
States had very little choice but to become a net importer of oil. Thirdly, the 1950s coincided with when growing 
nationalism and the great success of oil exploration made it imperative that the host countries insist on better 
concessionary agreements. The effect was a redefining of the basis for royalty payments at a fifty-fifty division 
of profits between the companies and their respective host governments.4 Invariably, profits accruing to host 
governments increased significantly, with the per-barrel payment to Saudi Arabia rising from $0.17, which it 
was in 1946 to $0.80 in 1956.5  
In spite of these perceived achievements that can be viewed as remarkable, the “Seven Sisters”, also 
known as the Majors, continued to dominate the system. By controlling almost all the World’s oil reserves, they 
were able to manage the price of oil. They were also able to continue maintaining control over both the upstream 
and downstream operations by ensuring that outsiders were blocked from crude oil exploration and production as 
well as from refining, transportation and marketing operations. 6  Certain other events however introduced 
dramatic changes to the oil industry. 
By the mid-1950, for instance, companies that were initially and previously not active in the 
international oil business obtained and successfully developed concessions with nations such as Algeria, Libya 
and Nigeria. Between 1952 and 1968, the production of the “seven sisters” reduced from 90 percent to 75 
percent7. 
In the oil producing states also, changes in elite attitudes, improved skills, less uncertainty and more 
especially, the emergence of new competitors, increased the bargaining power of the host governments8. The 
producer states now obtained larger percentages of earning and provisions for relinquishing exploited parts of 
concessions in the negotiations with emerging oil companies9. 
As would be expected, the oil producing states, especially large producers such as Libya and Saudi 
Arabia increased their earnings and began to accumulate significant foreign exchange reserves10. The foreign 
exchange reserves gave the governments the strength and power needed to absorb any short-term loss of 
earnings from an embargo or production reduction, designed to increase the price of oil or to obtain other 
concessions11. 
To worsen the reduction of the “Seven Sisters” control on the oil industry, changes that occurred at 
three different levels (the international oil industry, the oil producing states and the oil consuming states) 
invariably affected the control and authority of the “Seven Sisters”12. The first change was that competition 
                                                 
1 Ibid.126. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Wells, D. A. 1971. Aramco; The Evolution of an Oil Concession . Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and 
Mineral Industries Mikesell et al Eds; Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press.87. 
4 Ibid,89. 
5 Adelman A. M.1972. The World Petroleum Market. Baltimore, John Hopkins University.207. 
6 Richard, A. & Waterbury, J. 1990. A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class and Economic 
Development.Boulder: Westview Press.115. 
7 Wilkins M,1974. The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970. 
Cambridge, Mass; Harvard University Press. 386-387. 
8 Spero.1990.264, op cit. 
9 Ibid 264. 
10 Ibid.266. 
11 Ibid.267. 
12 Penrose, .1966.248-263. op. cit. 
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increased upstream, with new players seeking concessions to explore for and produce crude oil. The second 
change was that in the downstream operation, more refineries were built with competition growing in markets 
for refined oil1. 
More than any other issue however, the depreciation of oil prices served as the major event, which 
introduced a cartel of oil producers as against the cartel of oil companies that existed before it. Even though oil 
prices went through a steady increase during World War II, it faced a sharp decline after the war. While the oil 
majors were successful in avoiding sharp changes in prices in the 1950s, increased supplies of oil from North 
Africa and a rise in exports from the Soviet Union, forced the oil companies to reduce the posted prices of oil in 
1959 by 18 cents and again in 1960 by 10 cents2. 
While the reductions were not large, their impact was a shock to the producing countries. The most 
outstanding change was that it provided the oil producing governments that unique opportunity to co-operate 
with each other. Frustrated with the price cuts which invariably reduced their tax receipts, five of the major 
petroleum – exporting countries – Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela – met in 1960 to discuss 
unilateral action by oil companies and decided to form an Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, to 
protect the price of oil and revenues of their governments3.  
 
The Coming of OPEC  
The most successful effort of Southern countries to alter their dependency relationship with the North was the 
common action of OPEC in seizing control over the World’s oil market. By acting together in a producer cartel, 
the Southern oil-exporting states were able to increase not only their economic rewards but also their political 
power. 
The five nations that formed OPEC met in Baghdad in what can be referred to as a mood of excited 
confidence. Sampson quoted the owner-editor of the Middle East Economic Survey, Fuad Itayim, as 
stating, “the price cuts might precipitate the establishment of what some delegates chose to call “a cartel to 
confront the cartel” and Sampson agreed, “it had precisely that effect”4.  
The first resolution of OPEC made it clear that their chief enemy was the oil Companies as they declared 
That members can no longer remain indifferent to the attitude heretofore adopted by the oil 
companies in effecting price modifications; that members shall demand that oil companies 
maintain their prices steady and free from all unnecessary fluctuation; that members shall 
endeavour, by all means available to them, to restore present prices to the levels prevailing 
before their reductions. 5 
 
The establishment of OPEC in September 1960 came not only as a protective reaction following the 
unilateral reduction of the export price of oil by the transnational companies, but was also aimed at gaining 
economic sovereignty in the development of its members’ major and sometimes sole source of livelihood.6 
Six major forces actually existed in the oil industry before the emergence of OPEC in 1973.7 The first 
major force were the giant international companies which straddle the whole industry, both across geographical 
and across economic levels. The oil companies were grouped into two by Tanzer; the first being the seven major 
integrated international oil industries (the “international major”) such as Standard Oil of New Jersey, Royal 
Dutch Shell, Mobil, Texaco, Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of California and British Petroleum. The second were the 20 
– 30 generally smaller oil companies that have ventures into the international oil industry during the 1950s and 
1960s in a significant way, they were companies otherwise referred to as “new comers” or the “international 
minors” such as Phillips Petroleum, Standard Oil of Indiana, ENI etc.” 
The second major force was the home government of the international oil companies either 
headquartered in their country or controlled by their citizens. The United States was by far the most important 
Western government for the international oil industry since it was home to five of the seven majors and most of 
the important newcomers. Great Britain was the second most important Western Oil power, having a 
Government-owned) majority share in one of the seven majors (British Petroleum) and a 40 percent share in the 
remaining one (Royal Dutch Shell). The 60 percent share of Royal Dutch Shell controlled by Dutch citizens gave 
Holland an important stake, even if it was a passive role, in international oil. The stake of France resided both in 
the state-owned ERAP and in the partially government-owned Compagnic Francaise ders Petroles (CFP), which 
                                                 
1 Spero, 1990.263, op cit. 
2 Ibid.30. 
3 Mikdashi, 1962, op cit. 
4 Sampson, A.1978. The Seven Sisters; The Great Oil Companies and the World they made. New York, Viking.174. 
5 Ibid.175. 
6 Mikdashi.1980.1, op.cit. 
7 Ibid, 21-29. 
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was sometimes considered by eight of the international majors because even though small, shared production 
facilities with the Seven Majors in the Middle East. Japan was home to one of the important newcomers, the 
Japanese Arabian Oil Company, while Italy was equally home to the ENI. West-Germany, Spain and other 
Western European countries also sought to promote newly formed oil companies controlled by their own citizens. 
The third major force was the group of oil-exporting underdeveloped nations which were the well-
spring of the enormously profitable international oil flows; the most important of which before the 1973 oil 
embargo were four Middle Eastern countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Iraq, as well as two North Africa 
nations (Libya and Algeria). 
The fourth major force was the Soviet Union, which Tanzer claimed derived much of its influence from 
resurgence in the 1950s to its historical position as an important oil exporter. 
The fifth force was the group of international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), The World Bank and The United Nations. 
The sixth was the underdeveloped oil-importing nations such as Communist China, Topoland, Brazil, 
Tanzania, India and Ceylon. 
For both the founder members and those who joined later, OPEC provided a means for collective 
defence vis-à-vis a number of shared threats. These include; the pricing and production policies of the 
transnational companies, which affected the budgetary receipts of the Organisation and the economic policies of 
their major trading partners – the Western industrialized countries that maintain oil-exporting countries in a 
relationship of dependence as mere suppliers of raw materials1. 
On a more general level, OPEC members had to face the predicament of poverty among their 
populations and the sense of vulnerability, which is derived from the fact that their economies are narrowly 
based on oil. Moreover, OPEC has proved to be their means of defence against a repetition of the collective 
boycott faced by Iran between 1951 and 1953, which was imposed by the transnational oil companies. It has also 
served as a mechanism for coordinating the members’ strategies with respect to prices, industrialization and aids2. 
 The advantages of such collective deliberation and action are unfortunately translated only into larger 
oil revenues, mainly through increased prices. This has served as one of the greatest deficiencies of OPEC. 
This is because almost from the onset had it been very clear that OPEC was to serve the purpose of a 
revenue generation rather than being employed as a weapon. It is interesting to note that in spite of 
tremendous achievements recorded by OPEC at the early stage of presentation of demands for a new 
international economic order, the importance of oil more as a weapon than an income was not fully 
established. 
It could not have therefore come as a surprise that within the first ten years, and in spite of the fact that 
OPEC expanded from five to thirteen members and accounted for 85 percent of the World’s oil exports3, it met 
with very little success. All that the individual oil-producing states were able to achieve in those thirteen years 
was an increase in their revenues. The only remarkable achievement therefore was that the attitude of lowering 
oil prices died with the emergence of OPEC and the oil producing states also expanded their experience in 
cooperation4. 
In the final analysis, the fact that Western consuming countries became vulnerable to the threat of 
supply interruption or reduction was not fully exploited to OPEC’s favour. Unfortunately a focus on generation 
of income diminished the fact that oil became the primary source of energy. The focus on oil as a source of 
revenue  did not also strongly establish the fact that the United States’ reserves and production had considerably 
reduced. In spite of the fact that the developed market economies became increasingly dependent on foreign oil, 
especially oil from the Middle East and North Africa, virtually all-Arab nations5, very little positive result was 
attained until 1973 when the Arab oil producers imposed an embargo on industrialized nations.  
By 1972, Western Europe derived almost 60 percent of its energy from oil almost all of which was 
imported6. Oil from abroad supplied 73 percent of Japan’s energy needs and 46 percent of US energy came from 
from oil, and at least one-third of this was imported7. And by this year (1972), 80 percent of Western Europe and 
and Japanese oil imports came from the Middle East and North Africa. The United States also relied on the 
Middle East and North Africa for 15 percent of its oil imports8. It was only the adoption of a totally changed 
                                                 
1 Mikdashi, 1980.2,, op cit. 
2
 Migdal, J. 1980.Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society Relations & State Capabilities in the Third 
World, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 85, 1980. 
3 Mikdashi,. 1975.203. Op cit. 
4 Harbeson, J. and Rothchild, D.1991. Africa in World Politics.Boulder, Westview Press.107. 
5 Spero, 1990.265, op cit. 
6
 Darmstadter J. and Landsberg H.1975. The Economic Background. Daedalus..104.21. 
7 Spero.1990., 265. op cit. 
8 Darmstadter J.and Landsberg H. 1975.Op.Cit.23. 
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strategy by OPEC from 1973 that reverted the North-South relations. Invariably therefore rather than reserves 
that favoured the South, if OPEC had not taken its destiny into its own hands, very little would still have been 
achieved.  
One can therefore conveniently ascertain that the earlier Third World bargaining strategy of moderate 
diplomacy through the presentation of joint positions in international forums had to undergo a radical change 
before any appreciable gain; achievement, progress and advancement could be attained. The new feeling became 
securing resource transfers from the North through the threat of disruptions in the primary commodity markets, 
as opposed to mere appeals to Northern conscience.1 It was therefore only when Southern oil producing nations 
saw reason with a strategy that employs disruption of a critical primary product, that any noticeable achievement 
was recorded.  
As far as the South was concerned, the new oil power coordinated by OPEC suggests that a departure 
be made from appealing to the Northern conscience into antagonising the North; a change from persuasion to 
insistence.2 Interestingly, antagonism to the North seemed to have yielded positive results as attacks on the North, 
North, within the framework of a united front, established the fact that the North was primarily to be blamed for 
the poverty of the South.3 
 Coercive diplomacy of the Third World was therefore by far more effective in securing positive 
responses from the developed countries than the earlier recourse to persuasions as evident in the OPEC 
quadrupling of oil price between 1973 and 1974 and the success at changing the European nations’ alliance to 
Israel.4 
Indeed, the North became inclined towards proposing changes and reforms in the international 
economic system, unlike the old strategy of only responding to Third World demands.5 In February 1975 for 
instance, the Lome Convention was signed between members of the European Community and African, 
Caribbean and Pacific States.6 This happened to be the first major agreement between any part of the South and 
the North. What made the agreement more significant and an offshoot of the new oil power was that it not only 
accepted basis tenets of the NIEO proposals of the Less Developed Countries, but also “provided mechanisms, 
of varying degrees of effectiveness, for putting them into effect”.7 It is not surprising that the agreements of the 
Convention were hailed as “a new model for relations between developed and developing states, compatible with 
the aspirations of the international community towards a more just and balanced economic order”8  
In Kingston, Jamaica, at the May 1975 Commonwealth Summit, Prime Minister Harold Wilson of 
Great Britain unfolded a package fashioned “a new deal in world economy”, declaring British support for 
minimum earning guarantees for countries which depended upon a few key exports.9 In October of the same year 
year at the Ecole Polytechnique, French President Giscard d’Estaing called for “normalisation of raw material 
export prices and for stable export earnings for the South”10. 
The United States’ opposition to the demand for a new economic order, also considerably reduced. The 
US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger stated the United States was more willing to engage in constructive 
dialogue with countries in the South.11 The United States was also going to be forthcoming with new initiatives 
within the GATT, new financial arrangements within the IMF, and a new system of international food reserves12. 
The Secretary of State further declared that: 
We have heard and begun to understand your concerns. We want to be responsive. 
We are prepared to undertake joint efforts to alleviate your economic problems 
clearly this requires a posture of cooperation
13 
                                                 
1 Danielsen, A. L.1982. The Evolution of OPEC.  New York: Harcourt Brace Jonanovich. 115. 
2 Ghanem, S. 1986. OPEC : The Rise and Fall of an Exclusive Club. London, New York and Sidney KPI, 219. 
3 Zindani, op cit. 
4 Deagle, E. A. Jr. 1983. The Future of the International Oil Market .New York: Group of Thirty, 113. 
5 Kelly, J. B. 1980. Arabia, the Gulf, and the West: A Critical View of the Arabs and Their Oil Policy. New York: 
Basic Books. 7. 
6  Lome Dossier, 1975. The Courier, European Community-Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (Brussels: European 
Commission), 31, Special Issue. 1975. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Aribisala,F. 1983. Nigeria and OPEC. Nigeria’s External Relationships: The first twenty-five years. Olusanya 
G.O and Akindele R. Eds.  Ibadan, Ibadan University Press .136.  
9 Ghadar, F. 1977.The Evolution of OPEC Strategy. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.215. 
10 Ibid.221. 
11 Kissinger H. A.1975. Before the Wisconsin Institute of World Affairs. Milwankee, Washington DC, US 
Department of States. Press Release .370, 1975, 117. 
12 Ibid.117. 
13 Aribisala, op. cit., 138. 
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The Ineffectiveness of the South’s Oil Power: A Critical Analysis.  
The failure of the South at realising the agenda of a New International Economic Order and thus reduce 
its dependent status, is a testimony of the Southern deficient handling of North-South issues. The NIEO was not 
only a subtle threat to the Northern developed nations but was also a direct confrontation of what the developing 
nations perceived as an inequitable distribution of resources. It is therefore important to note from the onset that 
the issue of redesigning the economic order indicates certain important facts in international economic relations. 
The first is that the demands for a new international economic order emanated directly from the South. Secondly, 
the demands are of immense benefit to the South and may in fact reduce some of the powers, control and 
authority of the Northern developed nations. Third is that it is only through a Southern solution that the problem 
of the inequitable distribution of resources could be tackled.  What this suggests is that since the North 
extensively and considerably benefits from the economic order as it presently stands, it can only be unrealistic 
expecting a solution to what does not constitute a problem to the North from the developed nations. It can thus 
be emphatically stated that the unrealistic and unimpressive handling of demands for a New International 
Economic Order by the South has a very direct linkage on the continued domination of the South by the North. 
Rather than the South maintaining a posture, which would signify determination at a continued pressure on the 
North for a re-designing of the international economic system, the North was viewed as the only possibility of 
effecting such changes.  
Invariably therefore the brief 1973 episode in which the North-South relation was appreciably 
beneficial to the South could not be maintained. The radical approach at dealing with the North, which 
necessitated a departure from appealing to the Northern conscience to antagonising the North, dramatically 
changed again from 1975. The third World diplomacy reverted to a relatively more moderate tenor, basically 
because of the forthcoming approach to the Southern demands by the North. Also, even though OPEC still 
retained the power to increase the price of their oil, the fact that the investment of surplus petrol-dollar assets in 
the West tied the fortunes of the OPEC countries to the economic well being of the developed market-economy 
countries, had a boomerang effect on the proceeds from OPEC investments1. 
Consequently, the emergence of a new Southern dependency in the age of inter-dependence reduced the 
power the South had on the North. Since virtually all that was gained in the oil proceeds was spent on 
investments in the North, there was the need to employ a more moderate and by far softer approach to 
dealing with the North. This adversely affected the results that previous antagonism to the North had 
achieved. 
In the Paris Conference of 1975 therefore, talks between the North and the South degenerated into a 
long and frustrating standstill which lasted a better part of eighteen months. Actually, the Conference remained 
deadlocked on most of the issues it addressed 2. 
A basic impediment was the attitude of the South in bargaining with the North. This is because the 
South was only represented by only 19 countries that were afraid to negotiate on behalf of the Southern nations 
that did not attend the Conference and rather felt more comfortable sticking to positions already coordinated in 
advance3. 
As could be expected, this reluctance negatively affected extensive bargaining as maximal Southern 
appeal met with minimum Northern concessions, and the North-South dialogue moved back to the period where 
there was a total reliance and dependence on Northern acquiescence to Southern demands; what was described 
as a “cacophony of monologues often taking place simultaneously in the same room”4.  
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also continued in the earlier 
tradition of Southern demands and Northern denials, with Third World bloc-politics within the UNCTAD 
reverting to the gradualist approach to change, as opposed to the radical framework envisaged in earlier 
discussions and declarations. From UNCTAD IV in Nairobi in 1979, third world demands were discussed with 
very little or no substance achieved5. 
Between 1980 and 1985, discussions did not yield any result as the recommendations of the Brandt 
Commission Report of 1980, the short exchange of views between the North and the South at the Cancun 
Summit in 1981 and the UNCTAD VI in Belgrade in 1983, were all rhetoric without any serious action. In fact 
the UNCTAD VI  fell far short of expectations and was a far cry from what was achieved a little less than ten 
years earlier, when the Southern approach was radical, that it was described as “the most comprehensive failure 
                                                 
1 Aribisala,F. 1990.Collective Bargaining Strategies of Third World countries in international economic relations,1964-1987.  
Nigerian Journal of International Affairs. 14. 2: 135. 
2 Amuzegar J. 1977. A Requiem for the North South Conference. Foreign Affairs. 56. 1: 97. 
3 Ibid,97. 
4 Ibid,101. 
5 UNCTAD doc TD/195; 1976. 
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in 20 years of UNCTAD Conferences”1  
 The Northern domination of the South by the North has therefore continued in spite of substantial 
reserves of oil that favour the South even though its need is mainly in the North. The declaration at the second 
summit of Heads of State in 2000 for instance revealed OPEC's continued dream like hope in a Northern solution 
to the North- South issue. This was because OPEC at the summit stressed “the need for the industrialized 
countries to recognize their responsibility in helping to alleviate the crushing poverty”2. 
  At the conclusion of the Third United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in 
Brussels in 2001, the 43 countries that were in attendance adopted a declaration committing themselves to the 
eradication of poverty in the world's poorest countries. As noted by the OPEC Bulletin (of May 2001), this type 
of commitment from countries on both sides of the North-South divide has been seen many times over the years 
and yet despite all these good intentions, it sometimes appears that the gap between the world's rich and poor is 
not shrinking but becoming pronounced. This declaration goes to show that OPEC strongly believes that, 
(considering the fact that the gap between the North and South has continued to increase in spite of extraordinary 
levels of assistance by OPEC as an organization and as individual members), the only solution lies with a 
Northern cooperation. The reliance on the North for so long has not only been unsuccessful but can hardly be 
seen or viewed as a possible solution, as a reliance on a North that benefits greatly from the inequitable 
distribution of resources can only be fruitless. The solution can only be a Southern one and cannot but be radical, 
forceful and revolutionary. The OPEC Secretary-General is of the opinion that OPEC has done a lot in 
improving the North-South relation, declaring that “OPEC is mostly involved in the oil market, but it has long 
been aware of the need for improvements in world trade.’’  He claimed that in 1975, OPEC was part of the calls 
for the creation of a new international economic order which was premised on justice, mutual understanding 
and a genuine concern for the well being of all people of the world. He declared that OPEC also called on the 
industrialised and developing countries to get together in order to solve the problems facing the poor countries 
and to look for a way to establish a better economic system by allowing more trade and more exchange of 
knowledge between developing and OECD countries. He stated that it was for this purpose that OPEC Member 
Countries established the OPEC Fund for International Development in 1976 in order to assist non-OPEC 
developing countries to improve their economies, including their trade. 
 The OPEC member countries, themselves developing nations, have always believed that the issue of 
economic and social developments in the world’s Less Developed Countries and the eradication of poverty 
should be an overriding global priority. The issue was for instance raised in 1975 at the first summit of OPEC 
Heads of States in Algiers where the organization as an expression of solidarity with non-OPEC developing 
nations, decided to establish the OPEC Fund to provide financial resources to assist these countries in their 
economic and social development. In the first 25 years of existence the OPEC Fund extended development 
assistance worth over $5.8 Billion to more than one hundred countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, as well as the Middle East and parts of Europe. Individual OPEC members have also established a 
number of other aid institutions with similar aims3. 
  To indicate that a far more extensive measure needs be taken to considerably reduce the gap, the OPEC 
Bulletin (of May 2001) notes that in spite of the assistance from the OPEC Fund, the gap between the world’s 
rich and poor nations remains a yawning one.4 
Invariably, therefore, 25 years after the Fund was established, OPEC once again deemed it necessary to 
emphasize this issue in the organization’s Solemn Declaration at the second summit of Heads of State held in 
Caracas, Venezuela in 2000. To OPEC, solidarity among the Southern countries can only be about cooperation. 
OPEC Bulletin (October 2000) in discussing about OPEC’s way of solidarity with the Third world or developing 
nations proposed that the OPEC member countries extend development assistance to other developing nations, 
and specially referred to the OPEC Fund as the means by which OPEC countries could promote the development 
of the South.  
According to Abdullahi (2000), the creation of the OPEC Fund stemmed from the condition that the 
southern cooperation should work in conjunction with the North - South dialogue. 
 Perez-Cuerrero declared September 1984 that 
                                                 
1 Brandt W. 1981. North – South; A Programme for Survival. The Report of the Independent Commission of International 
Development Issues. London; Pan Books, 205. 
2 OPEC Bulletin, May 2001, 3. 
3 Ibid,3. 
4 Ibid,3. 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.4, No.10, 2014 
 
55 
The concept of collective self reliance (among developing countries) has become 
an indispensable  instrument to complement efforts at the North - South levels to 




According to OPEC, much has been done in the area of building a strong Southern solidarity, as 
Abudullahi, the Director General of the OPEC Fund stated that 
We have, in very close cooperation with beneficiary countries built 
infrastructure and funded works and schemes and research all in expression of 
solidarity with non -OPEC developing countries. We are carrying on a long 
tradition of OPEC aid, which did not begin with the OPEC fund. The Fund is 
only the culmination of series of endeavours, which saw the creation of several 





The OPEC Fund serves as OPEC’s answer, at least to some extent, to the poverty that the inequitable 
distribution of the present world order introduces. The Fund was conceived as a multilateral aid organization of 
OPEC States dedicated to promoting socio-economic advancement in the world’s underprivileged areas and 
contributing to the global fight against poverty. The Fund was given an adaptable mandate to direct its financial 
resources to where they are most needed and is likely to make the greatest impact.3 
 The Fund by 2000 had operated in 107 countries worldwide with commitments standing at $5.60 billion 
and disbursements of $3.8 billion. The fact that the gap has continued to widen between the North and the South 
however clearly shows that only by employing other strategies aimed at employing oil as a total, absolute and 
complete Southern weapon, can there be a reduction of the gap. This can hardly be attained by distributing the 
profits of oil to needy developing nations but through the effective utilization of the commodity as a weapon in a 
strategy of politics of scarcity. Not realizing the importance of changing the focus of the global community from 
its attitude to the raw material which the South is noted for, OPEC has continued to provide aid and assistance to 
other non-OPEC, non-oil producing developing nations, an action that has failed to yield the perceived results, as 
the poverty in the South has remained. Invariably therefore, in spite of OPEC’s aid, which is older than OPEC 
itself, not much has been achieved in bridging the gap. 
  OPEC aid can be traced back to programmes and projects initiated in the mid-1950, by Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia, initially motivated by moral commitment, toward their neighbours. The deep sense of regional 
community, evident in the two countries, and their awareness of the socio-economic requirements of regional 
stability and security led them to act as donors almost at the same time as they began to accumulate income.4 
 Kuwait took the lead in formalizing instruments for aid delivery, setting up a national aid organization 
and was soon followed by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development in December 1961. Ten years later, 
in 1971, the United Arab Emirates created the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development. In 1974, Saudi 
Arabia, Venezuela and Iraq followed suit, establishing respectively, the Saudi Fund for Development, the 
Venezuelan Investment Fund and the Iraqi Fund for External Development. In spite of these efforts however the 
gap between the Rich and Poor nations has continued to widen. 
 Finally, the problem with the South is that issues relating to its disadvantaged position in the 
international economic system have never assumed a primary contradiction to Southern developing nations. The 
issue of contradictions must be fully and firmly in place for the Southern dependent status to be considerably 
reduced.  The international community moves around in contradictions and what presently is viewed as a 
primary contradiction may become secondary when a more critical, important and significant issue or event 
takes over from it. In essence, what exists in the international system is actually a permanent problem without 
any notable permanent solution. 
 Only when the issue of dependency becomes a Southern primary contradiction that surpasses other 
contradictions such as the division in the South and the different interests of Southern developing nations to the 
developed nations can the oil potential be fully exploited. The division of Southern oil producing nations into 
OPEC and non-OPEC as well as the division of OPEC into the radical and the moderate and even the Arab and 
non-Arab, is an evidence of lingering dependent status of the South.  One of the critical problems of OPEC that 
brings to the fore the effects of long years of dependency in the South is the issue of non-OPEC nations. It can be 
adduced that since having both OPEC and non-OPEC nations within an organisation would have strengthened 
the oil power and by implication the bargaining power of the South vis-avis the North, it would have been more 
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logical and beneficial for the Southern oil producers to operate within a group. Interestingly, however, due to 
interests and dependencies of the Southern oil producing nations to the North, it has become easier and more 
convenient for them to exist as OPEC and non-OPEC nations, a division that has been extensively employed by 
the North at considerably reducing the oil power. It must be emphasised that the issue of non-OPEC nations can 
be viewed from two angles. One is OPEC’s position on membership and how OPEC itself views additional 
membership into the organization. Two, is how enthusiastic those critical oil-producing states within the South 
are, in joining the organization. The issue of an OPEC focus on additional membership as well as the lack of 
enthusiasm by critical Southern oil producers are the evidences of deep deficiencies in the Southern position to 
oil issues. Both are also directly linked, as the negative position of OPEC on membership and the not too eager 
attitude of critical Southern oil producers in joining OPEC indicate how deficient a presently structured OPEC is. 
It also shows how easily a division is created in the South along old cleavages to destroy the common front that 
would be critical to employing oil as a weapon. Both positions by OPEC and non-OPEC nations have therefore 
continued to have seriously negative effects on whatever possibility exists in using oil as a weapon at 
restructuring the economic system. To worsen this is the fundamental issue represented in lack of technical 
expertise in oil exploration and production. This greatly affects whatever advantage may have existed in terms of 
reserves in the Southern oil producing nations.    
 
CONCLUSION 
OPEC which started as a Southern bargaining organization has considerably been weakened by its focus on 
certain member states as more important than others and thereby dividing itself into Arab- non-Arab countries 
and even the radicals and the conservatives. This has appreciably affected the organization in being effective and 
has made it practically impossible for OPEC to serve the interests of all oil producing nations in the South. It can 
only be logical to expect that an organization that does not treat all its member states equally cannot also serve 
their interests in the same way and manner. By implication, OPEC could not have been expected to be a 
bargaining organization for the whole of the South if it does not view the entirety of the Southern nation equally. 
This has been the greatest challenge of the Southern bargaining responsibility of OPEC.  
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